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The Burger Court and Preemption Doctrine: Federalism
in the Balance
The supremacy clause of the Constitution, which provides that
federal law can preclude the operation of contrary state law, is the
foundation of the preemption doctrine.' Although constitutionally
based, the preemption doctrine is implemented through federal
statutes. 2 Arising out of our federalist system of government, the
preemption doctrine defines the boundaries of state power vis-a-vis
the federal government.3 The Supreme Court, through its inter-
pretation of the federal statutes involved and determination of con-
gressional intent, plays a major role in shaping the preemption
doctrine, and thus, the vitality of our federalism.
This note examines the Burger Court's treatment of preemp-
tion cases, specifically its application of traditional preemption stan-
dards in reconciling competing state and federal interests. Part I
explores the types of preemption and resultant preemption stan-
dards which previous Courts developed. Part II analyzes several
Burger Court preemption decisions. This analysis focuses upon the
Court's attempt to maintain a balance of federalism by curbing the
I This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONsT. art. VI, c. 2.
A state law may be contrary to a federal law in several ways. First, the federal law may,
on its face, expressly preclude the state law. Second, the state law may directly conflict with
the federal law or hinder the accomplishment of the federal law's objectives. Third, the
federal law may leave no room for the state law, thereby occupying the field. See note 7
infra.
2 Traditionally, the preemption doctrine has arisen where the federal government has
acted in some manner, i.e., where a federal statute exists. For example, in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), the Court stated: "The test. . . is whether the matter
on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act. If it is,
the federal scheme prevails though it is a more modest, less pervasive regulatory plan than
that of the State." Id. at 236.
3 A federalist system requires a rule for determining the priority of law in the event of
a conflict between the state and federal law. James Madison realized that a central govern-
ment, with laws subordinate to the laws of the individual states, would be powerless. Ac-
cording to Madison, if the state constitutions had remained supreme,
the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded on
an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have seen
the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the
parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the direction of
the members.
THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 287 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The Framers of the
Constitution, therefore, included the supremacy clause. See note 1 supra.
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excesses of federal power without restricting the legitimate exercise
of that power. Part III suggests that the Burger Court has applied
the traditional preemption standards, tailoring them to the subject
matter of the statutes and the type of preemption involved. It con-
cludes that the dominant theme of the Burger Court's preemption
decisions is to uphold the legitimate exercise of federal power,
while not preempting state law in situations where it can be
avoided. In achieving this goal, the Court appears more willing to
preempt state law in areas involving traditionally strong federal
concerns than in areas involving traditional uses of a state's police
power. Similarly, the Court has been more willing to preempt a
state law using a conflict analysis rather than an occupation of the
field preemption analysis.
I. Development of the Preemption Doctrine: Express, Conflict,
and Occupation of the Field
Preemption can occur whenever a state attempts to regulate in
an area where the federal government has the power to act.4 Be-
cause preemption cases involve a broad range of subject matters
and a variety of statutes, 5 each decision is fact specific. The out-
come in one preemption case will not necessarily determine the
outcome of the next case. 6 Consequently, the analysis underlying
each decision is important in ascertaining whether a consistent
"doctrine" of preemption exists.
4 Because the preemption doctrine is based upon the supremacy clause, federal law
can preempt state law in any situation where the Constitution grants the federal govern-
ment the power to regulate. See note 1 supra. However, speaking in regard to the
supremacy clause, Alexander Hamilton stated:
But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the [federal government] which
are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residu-
ary authorities of the [states], will become the supreme law of the land. These will
be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such.
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
The Burger Court, in Arkansas Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 375 (1983), stated that "a federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may
imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in
that event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate." Id. at 384
(emphasis in original).
5 For example, preemption problems have arisen in such disparate situations as cable
television broadcasts, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984); construc-
tion of nuclear power plants, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserva-
tion & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); business takeovers, Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1982); solid waste disposal, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978); employment of illegal aliens, DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); trade secrets,
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); and record piracy, Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
6 See Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515. "The need
for focussing on . . . specifics means that the Court's preemption decisions are largely
based on ad hoc considerations, especially on the exact statutes in question." Id. at 520-21.
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The Supreme Court traditionally has recognized three types of
preemption-express, conflict, and occupation of the field.7 By an-
alyzing cases in this manner, the Court also defines the scope of its
role in preempting state law.8 Preemption thus deals not only with
the relationship between the state and federal governments but also
with the proper role of the Supreme Court within the federal
government.9
Express preemption of a state law occurs when Congress spe-
cifically states in the federal statute that it intends to preempt state
law in a particular area.' 0 Such a "preemption clause" divests the
Court of any discretion on the question of preemption." If the
Court finds that Congress acted within its constitutionally defined
power, the federal law will prevail over contrary state law. The ex-
plicit statement of congressional intent obviates the need for ajudi-
cially created standard to resolve express preemption problems.
Thus, these cases generate few difficulties and little dissension
within the Court.' 2 This note focuses on the more problematic
conflict and occupation of the field preemption cases.' 3
Conflict preemption can arise in one of two ways. First, a state
law may require a person to do something which a federal law for-
bids. 14 This creates an impossibility of performance situation and
7 See, e.g., Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd.,
104 S. Ct. 2518, 2523 (1984) (detailing the thrde ways in which preemption of state law can
occur-express, conflict, and occupation of the field).
8 The Court's role varies with the type of preemption involved. In express preemp-
tion cases, the Court plays a minor role; its role increases in conflict and occupation of the
field cases. See notes 11, 17, 18, and 22 infra and accompanying text.
9 Hirsch, supra note 6, at 533.
10 See, e.g.,Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-31 (1977) (Because the "ex-
plicit pre-emption provision [in the federal law] dictate[d] the result in the controversy" the
federal law prevailed.). Instead of a preemption clause, Congress may include a savings
clause in the federal statute whereby any state law in the regulated area is specifically ex-
cepted, or "saved," from federal preemption. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 222-23 (1947) (The United States Warehouse Act originally included a savings
clause which stated that nothing in the act would limit or impair state law with regard to
warehouses and warehousemen.).
11 The Court's opinion as to whether or not preemption of the state law is desirable is
irrelevant to the decision. See note 10 supra.
12 See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). Justice Rehnquist agreed
with the majority opinion that the preemption problem as to the labeling of packaged ba-
con was solved by the preemption clause in the Federal Meat Inspection Act. However, he
dissented in the Court's finding of conflict preemption for the labeling of packaged flour.
Id. at 543-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see note 43 infra.
13 This note will also exclude a discussion of preemption cases involving the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which deserve more thorough treatment than can be given
in this note. The Burger Court's NLRA preemption cases include Brown v. Hotel & Res-
taurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984) (no preemp-
tion of state law); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 591 (1983) (no preemption of state law);
Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983) (state law pre-
empted); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978) (no preemption of state law).
14 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). The Court
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thus, an actual conflict. In such a situation the supremacy clause
mandates that the state law yield to the federal law.1 5 Although di-
rectly governed by the supremacy clause, actual conflict cases allow
the Court to exercise some discretion because the Court can decide
how much conflict must exist before a state law is preempted.1 6
Conflict preemption may also arise when a state law, although
not in actual conflict with the federal law, poses "an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." 17 In such cases the Court must interpret the federal
statute to ascertain its objectives and then determine whether the
state law poses an obstacle to those objectives.' 8 Thus, obstacle
conflict preemption allows the Court the discretion to determine
initially what the federal objectives are and then whether the state
law poses an obstacle to those objectives.' 9
Occupation of the field preemption results when the Court
concludes that by passing a federal regulation, Congress impliedly
intended to preclude state regulation in the same area. 20 Perhaps
because of the danger of misinterpreting unexpressed congres-
sional intent, 21 the Court requires that this intent be "clear and
stated: "A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry
into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility .... " Id. at 142-43.
15 See note 1 supra.
16 See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975). The author points out that some previous Supreme Court
decisions required an actual conflict before a state law was preempted, while other deci-
sions held the state law preempted because of a potential conflict with the federal law. Id. at
627, 636. See also text accompanying note 37 infra.
17 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
18 See id. at 67. The Court observed:
There is not-and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be-any rigid
formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning
and purpose of every act of Congress . . . . In the final analysis, there can be no
one crystal clear distinctly marked formula.
Id.
19 In ascertaining the objectives of the federal law, the Court looks to the specific stat-
utes and facts involved in the case before it. See, e.g., id. at 67-68. In preempting a Penn-
sylvania Alien Registration law, the Court considered the fact that the registration of aliens
was an area important to international relations and that it demanded broad national au-
thority. Id. at 68.
But this determination of federal objectives permits room for judicial legislation, per-
haps allowing a state law to operate where Congress would have preempted it or vice versa.
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983). The Court realized that it could end up performing a legislative role;
it declined to do so by refusing to find occupation of the field preemption. Id. at 223; see
note 119 infra.
20 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). The Court found that
Congress had legislated in the area of warehousemen and that "Congress in effect said that
the policy which it adopted in each of the nine [matters charged in the complaint] was
exclusive of all others .... ." Id. at 235-36.
21 In addition to not having expressed its intent explicitly, Congress may not even have
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manifest." 22 This insistence offsets the comprehensive effect of oc-
cupation of the field preemption.2 3 In addition, when dealing with
occupation of the field preemption, the Court generally maintains a
presumption against the preemption of state law. 24
Over the years, pre-Burger Court decisions have laid the foun-
dation for the preemption doctrine, each case adding substance to
the supremacy clause skeleton. The Burger Court, therefore, has
had to incorporate existing preemption principles into its analysis
and decisions, tailoring the preemption doctrine to respond to the
steadily expanding scope of federal power. The Burger Court is
confronted with the problem of recognizing the expansiveness of
federal power while preserving state power when a particularly lo-
cal interest is involved or when the federal government has over-
stepped its authority.
considered the preemptive effect of its legislation. See Hirsch, supra note 6, at 542. The
author notes that "[q]uestions of the relation of the federal law to existing and potential
state laws are seldom considered in detail in the drafting of federal legislation. Conse-
quently, many federal acts are adopted without serious consideration of their impact on
state laws dealing directly with the same subject matter." This fact complicates the resolu-
tion of this type of preemption.
22 331 U.S. at 230. The Court has identified several important factors in determining
Congress' intent to preempt state law: 1) the federal regulation may be so pervasive that a
state law cannot operate in the same area; 2) the federal interest may be so dominant in an
area that the states are precluded from regulating it; 3) the object to be obtained by the
federal law and the type of obligations imposed by it may disclose the same purpose; and 4)
the result of the state law may be inconsistent with the objective of the federal law. Id.
The need for national uniformity is another indication that Congress intended to pre-
empt any state regulations in an area. See Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New
Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959). The author notes that "[w]hen federal
action is inspired by a desire to avoid multiple and conflicting state regulation, or to circum-
vent the parochial attitude of local authorities, the context strongly suggests that the states
should not be allowed to continue to govern matters subject to federal regulation." Id. at
215-16. See also note 19 supra.
23 Occupation of the field preemption is the most comprehensive type of preemption
because a state law can be preempted although it does not actually conflict with the federal
law in any way. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504, reh'g denied, 351 U.S.
934 (1956) (The Court concluded that Congress had occupied the field of sedition and
"[t]herefore, a state sedition statute is superceded regardless of whether it purports to sup-
plement the federal law.").
24 See Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902) ("It should never be held that Con-
gress intends to supercede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of the police powers of
the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect that result is clearly mani-
fested."). See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)
(preemption of state law should not occur unless there are persuasive reasons for doing so);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (police power of the states is not
to be superceded by the federal law "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress"); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940) (congressional intent to pre-
empt is not to be inferred unless clearly indicated). The presumption against preemption is
not limited to occupation of the field preemption. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
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II. Burger Court Preemption Decisions
The Burger Court has decided numerous preemption cases
during its fifteen year term. While weaving its way through a maze
of diverse statutes and subject matters, the Court has sought to
maintain a balanced system of federalism. The Court's goal has
been to permit the legitimate exercise of congressional power while
curbing abuses of that power. 25 The decisions exhibit the tension
inherent in attempting to protect the states from congressional ex-
cesses while simultaneously prohibiting them from interfering with
legitimate federal regulatory schemes.
An analysis according to the type of preemption and the sub-
ject matter involved demonstrates that, in attempting to achieve a
balanced federalism, the Burger Court preempts state law more
readily in cases involving conflict preemption and a subject matter
that is traditionally a federal concern. Conversely, the Court is less
willing to preempt state law in occupation of the field cases-where
it must infer congressional intent-and when the subject matter is
local in nature. 26 This pattern emerges through an examination of
the pertinent decisions.
A. Conflict Preemption
In the majority of conflict preemption cases the Burger Court
has considered, it has held that the federal law preempted state
law.27 The Burger Court has occasionally upheld the state law,
however, especially when the subject matter of the case involved
particularly local interests. 28
1. The Actual Conflict Situation
In Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. ,29 the Court struck down two
Virginia statutes which limited the rights of nonresidents and aliens
to fish within the state's territorial waters.30 The statutes actually
conflicted with a federal statute which, according to the Court,
25 It has long been recognized that unauthorized acts of Congress are mere usurpations
of power and not the supreme law of the land. See note 4 supra.
26 One author argues that preemption decisions are dependent upon the protection
afforded by the state law. The author concludes that state laws which protect "vital state
interests" are generally not preempted. See Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88
YALE L.J. 363, 389 (1978).
27 See, e.g., Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd.,
104 S. Ct. 2518, 2520 (1984); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 861 (1984);
Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 104 S. Ct. 291, 292 (1983); Shaw v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 108-09 (1983); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 184 (1983);
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 635, 639 (1982);
Maryland v. Louisana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981).
28 See, e.g., notes 35, 45, and 52 infra.
29 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
30 Id. at 267, 286.
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granted not only the right to navigate in state waters but also "the
right to fish in Virginia waters on the same terms as Virginia resi-
dents." 3 1 In addition to this actual conflict, the Court identified a
strong federal interest: "Such proliferation of residency require-
ments for commercial fishermen would create precisely the sort of
Balkanization of interstate commercial activity that the Constitution
was intended to prevent."3 2 Thus, although the states had a valid
interest in preserving their marine life and natural resources,33 this
combination of an actual conflict and an area traditionally regulated
by the federal government3 4 left the Court little choice but to hold
the state laws preempted.
The existence of an actual conflict requires the preemption of
state law under the supremacy clause. The Court, however, can
mold the preemption decision by varying the extent of the conflict
necessary to label the situation an "actual conflict." For example,
in Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,35 the Court upheld a California stat-
ute which permitted liquor distillers to designate which wholesalers
could import the distiller's products into the state, despite chal-
lenges that the state law was preempted by both the Sherman Anti-
trust Act and the Federal Alcohol Administration Act.36
The Court stated that a hypothetical conflict would not suffice
to preempt a state law. Rather, preemption requires "an irreconcil-
able conflict between the federal and state regulatory schemes." 37
Thus, the Court held that the California statute was not preempted
on its face by the antitrust laws because it did not authorize conduct
which constituted a violation of the antitrust laws in all situations. 38
The statute also was not preempted by the Federal Alcohol Admin-
31 Id. at 281. The Court utilized the historic decision of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824), to illuminate the meaning of the federal Enrollment and Licensing Act.
431 U.S. at 275. The Court noted that "[t]he federal licenses granted to Seacoast are...
identical in pertinent part to Gibbons' licenses except that they cover the 'mackerel fishery'
rather than the 'coasting trade.'" Id. at 280.
32 431 U.S. at 286.
33 The Court recognized that "States may impose upon federal licensees reasonable,
nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection measures otherwise within
their police power." Id. at 277. See also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440 (1960).
34 431 U.S. at 272. "The basic form for the comprehensive federal regulation of trad-
ing and fishing vessels was established in the earliest days of the Nation and has changed
little since." Id.
35 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
36 Id. at 656. The state statute provided that a "licensed importer shall not purchase or
accept delivery of any brand of distilled spirits unless he is designated as an authorized
importer of such brand by the brand owner or his authorized agent." Id. at 656-57 (quoting
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 23672 (West Supp. 1982)).
37 458 U.S. at 659.
38 Id. at 661. The Court, however, noted that:
upholding the validity of the designation statute will not insulate a distiller's invo-
cation of the statute from scrutiny under the Sherman Act. The manner in which a
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istration Act, which prohibited a distiller from establishing exclu-
sive retail outlets, because the state law did not require exclusive
retail outlets, but merely exclusive wholesalers.3 9
Perhaps due to the lack of a strong federal interest in the
area, 40 the Court did not find the requisite "irreconcilable conflict"
and therefore permitted the state law to operate. The Court pre-
served the balance of federalism by not preempting the state law
until such time as an irreconcilable conflict arose. By adopting this
approach, the Court also deferred to Congress' ability to act if it
wanted to preempt state regulation in the field, rather than acting
legislatively itself.41
2. The Obstacle Conflict Situation
a. The Early Cases
Unlike the actual conflict situation, obstacle conflict cases re-
quire the Court to ascertain the federal law's objectives. 42 In deter-
mining whether the state law poses an obstacle to those objectives,
the Court generally considers the state and federal interests in-
volved.43 In two of the Burger Court's early obstacle conflict
distiller utilizes the designation statute and the arrangements a distiller makes with
its wholesalers will be subject to Sherman Act analysis under the rule of reason.
Id. at 662.
39 Id. at 663-64.
40 California had a legitimate interest in preventing liquor importers from frustrating a
distiller's distribution chain by buying liquor from out-of-state wholesalers. Id. at 657.
41 This reluctance to legislate for Congress is a recurring theme in the Burger Court's
preemption decisions. See, e.g., note 119 infra and accompanying text.
42 In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), the Burger Court articulated a two-step
analysis for deciding when an obstacle conflict exists. The Court's job is to "first ascertai[n]
the construction of the two statutes and then determin[e] the constitutional question
whether they are in conflict." Id. at 644.
43 For example, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), the Court pre-
empted a California statute which required the net weight label on food packages to accu-
rately state the actual net weight of the food. When applied to packaged flour, the Court
found that the statute posed an obstacle to the objective of the federal Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act ("FPLA") which was "to facilitate value comparisons among similar prod-
ucts." Id. at 541.
The California statute did not permit variations between the stated and actual net
weights while the FPLA (through the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act) allowed rea-
sonable variations in weight due to the gain or loss of moisture. Id. at 531-33. The Court
concluded that the state statute would induce the overpacking of flour (manufacturers had
to be concerned only with short weighted packages, since the state did not prosecute for
over weighting), while manufacturers operating under the federal statute would not need to
overpack. Thus, consumers would be comparing flour packages with the same stated net
weights but different actual net weights. Id. at 542-43.
Congress' exercise of power in the area was legitimate under the Constitution. In the
absence of any strong local interest, however, the Court refused to uphold the state law
when it might frustrate the federal law's objective. Justice Rehnquist, however, argued in
dissent that "[tihis latter pre-emption is founded in unwarranted speculations that hardly
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cases,44 the Court permitted state statutes to operate where the
state interest was strong and either no conflict or only a potential
conflict existed.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. Ware,45 a Califor-
nia statute permitted wage earners to sue and recover unpaid wages
regardless of contrary private agreements.46 The federal law, a
New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") rule promulgated pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, compelled the arbitration of
wage disputes.47 The Court determined that the federal law's
objectives were to insure fair dealing and to protect investors from
unfair trading practices. 48 The NYSE rule did not affect fair dealing
or investor protection and thus was subject to state regulation.49
According to the Court, the state interest involved "a strong
policy of protecting its wage earners from what it regard[ed] as un-
desirable economic pressures affecting the employment relation-
ship." 50 In upholding the state law, the Court focused on this
strong state interest and the lack of any strong federal interest. The
Court found that the state law posed no real obstacle to the aims of
the federal law. 5'
rise to that clear demonstration of conflict that must exist before the mere existence of a
federal law may be said to pre-empt state law operating in the same field." Id. at 544.
The Court subsequently classified the preparation of foodstuffs for marketing as a par-
ticularly local concern in Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. and Bar-
gaining Bd., 104 S. Ct. 2518, 2523 (1984). The Court nevertheless preempted a Michigan
statute which established a state-administered system certifying certain producers' associa-
tions as collective bargaining agents for all producers of a particular commodity. Individual
producers were not required to join the association. They were required, however, to pay a
service fee to the association and were bound by contracts which the association negotiated
whether or not they were a member of the association. The Court found that the Michigan
law frustrated the purpose of the federal law by denying the individual producers the choice
of whether or not to join a producers' association. Id. at 2520-27. Thus, the Court demon-
strated how solicitous it can be towards exercised federal power. Again the federal govern-
ment had legitimately regulated in the area and the Court refused to protect the state from
that power, despite the presence of a "local" interest.
44 See Note, supra note 16, at 651-53. The author theorizes that during its early years,
1970-1975, the Burger Court maintained a state-directed bias in its preemption decisions.
45 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
46 Id. at 131.
47 Merrill Lynch, a broker-dealer firm, employed Ware as a registered representative.
Ware quit his job to work for one of Merrill Lynch's competitors. Because of this competi-
tive activity, he was found to have forfeited his rights (vested and unvested) to benefits from
a noncontributory profit sharing plan. Ware filed a class action suit based on the California
law. Merrill Lynch defended on the ground that Ware, who had been registered by the
NYSE, by signing the necessary NYSE forms, had agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising
from the termination of employment. Id. at 119-24.
48 Id. at 130. The Securities and Exchange Commission achieved this goal by supervis-
ing the self regulation of the securities exchanges. Id. at 128-29.
49 Id. at 138. The "housekeeping affairs" of the securities exchanges did not require
uniformity. Id. at 136.
50 Id. at 13940.
51 Id. The Court noted "that the proper approach [when dealing with preemption] is to
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Subsequently, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp,52 the Court held
that an Ohio trade secrets law was not preempted by the federal
patent laws.5 3 The federal patent laws sought to encourage inven-
tion and disclosure. 54 The state trade secrets law, conditioning
protection on the fact that the trade secrets remain secret, sought
to encourage invention and business fair dealing.55 Despite this
possible obstacle to the disclosure objective of the patent laws,
which involve an area traditionally of federal concern, the Court
upheld the state law as long as it posed no substantial risk that peo-
ple with patentable discoveries would rely on the state law rather
than a federally granted patent.56
The Court emphasized that Congress' failure to prohibit the
states from enacting trade secrets laws. 57 Accordingly, the Court
found that no obstacle which would prevent the state law's opera-
tion yet existed. Unless the state law created a conflict with the fed-
eral law, the Court refused to preempt it and upset the existing
balance of federalism in a situation where Congress had not yet ex-
ercised its power.58
b. Ray and de la Cuesta: Balancing Interests?
The Court's balancing of state and federal interests in the con-
flict area apparently peaked in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,59 a case
involving both types of conflict preemption. The Court applied
conflict preemption analysis to each provision of a Washington
state law which regulated oil tankers in Puget Sound, rather than
reconcile 'the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding
one completely ousted.' " Id. at 127 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
357 (1963)).
52 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
53 Id. at 474. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
The Court determined that this clause did not grant exclusive power to Congress.
Therefore, "[t]he only limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and
copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by Con-
gress .... ." 416 U.S. at 479.
54 Id. at 480-81.
55 Id. at 481,484.
56 Id. at 489.
57 Id. at 493. "Until Congress takes affirmative action to the contrary, States should be
free to grant protection to trade secrets." Id.
58 Justice Douglas, dissenting, concluded that "[t]he conflict with the patent laws is
obvious" and would have upheld the lower court's preemption of the state law. Id. at 496,
499 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The discretion of the Court to determine whether or not the
state law poses an obstacle is apparent from the fact that the dissent's conclusion is the
polar extreme of the majority decision. See also note 43 supra.
59 435 U.S. 151 (1978)
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holding the entire statute preempted.60 Thus, a portion of the stat-
ute which required state licensed pilots was preempted because it
actually conflicted with the federal statute mandating federally li-
censed pilots. 6 1 The Court preempted other provisions requiring
particular design standards because they posed obstacles to the fed-
eral objective of a uniform national standard for tanker design.62
The Court, however, permitted the operation of the state law provi-
sion requiring tug escorts for substandard design tankers because
the federal law was silent on the matter.63 In preempting that part
of the state law which conflicted with the federal law, the Court rec-
ognized both the legitimacy of the federal regulations and the im-
portance of the federal interest in uniform tanker design. 64 At the
same time, the Court accommodated the substantial state interest
in protecting the marine environment from possible oil spill dam-
age, noting that a state was free to pass "reasonable, nondiscrimi-
natory conservation and environmental protection measures." 65
Ray epitomizes the Burger Court's concern for permitting the
legitimate exercise of federal power without encroaching unneces-
sarily upon the states' reserved power. The Court preempted no
more of the state law than necessary, thus reaching a decision which
preserved federalism to the greatest extent possible.
The Court, however, did not follow this restrained balancing
approach in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta.66
In de la Cuesta, the Court preempted a California law which drasti-
cally limited the ability of federal savings and loan associations to
60 Id. at 159-61, 173-74. A threejudge panel of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington had preempted the state law in its entirety. Id. at 156.
61 The federal law, 46 U.S.C. §§ 215, 364 (1982) (repealed 1983), preempted that part
of the state law requiring enrolled vessels to take on a state-licensed pilot while navigating
through Puget Sound. Section 215 prohibited the states from requiring that federally li-
censed pilots obtain state licenses. Section 364 required such pilots to be licensed by the
Coast Guard. 435 U.S. at 158-59.
62 The federal law, 46 U.S.C. § 391(a) (1982) (repealed 1983), imposed minimum de-
sign standards to ensure vessel safety and protect the marine environment. Id. at 160. The
federal law thus preempted the state tanker design requirements because, according to the
Court, the federal objective was to achieve uniformity in tanker design by "foreclos[ing] the
imposition of different or more stringent state requirements." Id. at 163.
63 The state law provided that if its design standards were not met, a tug escort could
be utilized. The Court upheld this provision because the Secretary of Transportation had
neither promulgated his own requirement nor decided that such a requirement could not
be imposed. Id. at 160, 171-72.
64 Id. at 166 n.15.
65 Id. at 164 (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Prod., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 277 (1977)). But
the Court also noted that the state could not impose a substantive rule which had the same
objective as the federal law. 435 U.S. at 164. See also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. De-
troit, 362 U.S. 440, 44546 (1960) (The Court found that a Detroit ordinance aimed at
reducing air pollution was not preempted by federal ship inspection laws. The Court con-
cluded "that there is no overlap between the scope of the federal ship inspection laws and
that of the municipal ordinance here involved."). Id. at 446.
66 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
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exercise due-on-sale clauses in mortgages. 67 The Federal Home
Loan Bank Board had issued a regulation, pursuant to the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933,68 which permitted, but did not require,
federal savings and loan associations to include and exercise due-
on-sale clauses. 69 The federal regulation's purpose was to ensure
the financial soundness of the savings and loan associations
through the use of the due-on-sale clauses. 70
In determining that the federal law preempted the California
statute, the Court applied an obstacle conflict preemption analysis.
It found that the California law posed an obstacle to the federal
regulation's objective because it inhibited the free exercise of the
due-on-sale clause and therefore impeded the ability of the savings
and loan associations to deal with special situations.7 1
The de la Cuesta Court's reasoning differs from the traditional
preemption analyses in several respects. First, the Court began
with an occupation of the field preemption analysis and then ex-
pressly declined to decide that question.72 Second, the presump-
67 Id. at 170. A due-on-sale clause is "a contractual provision that permits the lender to
declare the entire balance of a loan immediately due and payable if the property securing
the loan is sold or otherwise transferred." Id. at 145. The California Supreme Court had
held that a lender could enforce a due-on-sale clause only to protect itself against the risk of
default. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 977, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1978).
68 The Board could prescribe rules and regulations "to provide for the organization,
incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation" of federal savings and loan associa-
tions. 458 U.S. at 145 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (a)). Since "mortgages are a central part
of any savings and loan's 'operation,'" the Court concluded that the Board could issue
regulations governing mortgages. 458 U.S. at 161.
69 Id. at 155. The Superior Court of California for Orange County found that the fed-
eral law occupied the field regarding savings and loan associations such that the California
law could not operate. Id. at 149.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Appellate District reversed. That court identified
several reasons why the state law was not preempted: 1) Congress had expressed no intent
to preempt state due-on-sale law; 2) Congress had not occupied the field of regulation
regarding savings and loan associations; 3) federal savings and loan associations tradition-
ally were operated under state real property law; 4) congressional intent was not equal to
the Board's intent to preempt; 5) no conflict existed between the state law (a substantive
property and mortgage law) and the federal regulation (regulating savings and loan associa-
tions); and 6) the Board's regulation authorized, but did not require the due-on-sale
clauses. Id. at 149-50.
70 Id. at 155-56.
71 Id. at 155. The Court also rejected an argument that since Congress had explicitly
preempted or incorporated some state laws in the Home Owners' Loan Act ("HOLA"), the
Board could not issue other regulations displacing state law. Id. at 162.
72 Id. at 154-55. The Court attempted to ascertain Congress' intent to preempt Califor-
nia's due-on-sale law by equating congressional intent with that of the Board. Because the
Court found that the Board's intent to preempt was unequivocal and that it had acted
within its authority, the federal regulation had the same preemptive effect as a federal stat-
ute. Id. at 158. The Court, however, expressly declined to decide "whether the HOLA or
the Board's regulations occupy the field of due-on-sale law or the entire field of federal
savings and loan regulation." Id. at 159 n.14. Normally, an inquiry into congressional in-
tent to preempt is only necessary in occupation of the field preemption cases. A conflict
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tion against preemption which normally accompanies an
occupation of the field analysis is absent from the Court's opinion.
Additionally, the Court dismissed the state's interest in the integrity
of its real property and contract laws although such areas tradition-
ally have been respected as being within the state's domain. 7"
The Court's failure to consider the state's interest in its prop-
erty law and the decision that the state law was preempted 74 dis-
rupted whatever balance of federalism existed in the area.
Arguably, the Board's exercise of power was outside its authority.
The Court could have upheld the state law until Congress ex-
pressed its desire to preempt. The Court, however, believed the
Board acted within its authority and that the regulation was a legiti-
mate exercise of federal power. As such, the state law posed an
obstacle to the federal law's objectives. To maintain the division of
power between the state and federal governments, the Court held
the state law preempted.75
The Court returned to a more restrained preemption approach
in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp.76 The Crisp Court held that Fed-
eral Communications Commission ("FCC") regulations 77 prohibit-
ing cable television operators from deleting or altering out-of-state
signals preempted an Oklahoma statute requiring operators to de-
lete wine advertisements in the out-of-state signals which they re-
preemption analysis normally focuses on the federal law's objectives. See notes 24 and 42
supra. The Court also found no impossibility of performance situation and therefore no
actual conflict. Id. at 155.
73 The Court found that preemption
principles are not inapplicable here simply because real property law is a matter of
special concern to the States: "The relative importance to the State of its own law
is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of
our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail."
Id. at 153 (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).Justice Rehnquist disagreed on
this point. He noted, in dissent, that "[d]ischarge of its mission to ensure the soundness of
federal savings and loans does not authorize the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to intrude
into the domain of state property and contract law that Congress has left to the States." Id.
at 175 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
74 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that if the Board found that the California law
"endanger[ed] the soundness of the system established by the HOLA and the [Federal
Home Loan Bank Act], then the response contemplated by Congress is for the Board to
'withhold or limit the operation' of the system in California." Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
75 Congress subsequently preempted all state regulations regarding the enforceability
of due-on-sale clauses by passing the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, 12
U.S.C. § 170 1j-3 (1982). For a discussion of de la Cuesta and the Garn-St. Germain Act, see
Note, Garn-St. Germain: Congress Preempts Due-On-Sale-Fills Void Left by De La Cuesta, 12
STSON L. REV. 461 (1983).
76 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
77 As in de la Cuesta, this case involved a federal agency's regulations. The Court quoted
the language from de la Cuesta which held that federal regulations had the same preemptive
effect as federal statutes subject only to the determination of whether the agency had ex-
ceeded its authority. Id. at 2700.
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transmitted to their customers. 78
Because the state law regulated cable signal transmission, an
area which the FCC had claimed as federal territory, the Court
found a "generalized federal pre-emption of state regulation of
cable signal carriage." 79 The Court could have held the state law
preempted on an occupation of the field analysis because the FCC's
intent was to preclude the states from regulating signal carriage.
Nevertheless, the Court decided to examine the specific federal reg-
ulations involved.80 The Oklahoma statute negated the federal ob-
jective of providing widespread availability of diverse cable
services81 by forcing the operator either to drop the programming
or face criminal charges under the state law.8 2 The Court's utiliza-
tion of an obstacle conflict analysis rather than an occupation of the
field analysis demonstrates its hesitancy to use this more compre-
hensive type of preemption absent compelling necessity.
The Court first found that the federal regulation preempted
the state law. Then, because the twenty-first amendment was in-
volved,83 the Court balanced the state interest in discouraging alco-
hol consumption through a ban on its advertisement against the
federal interest in a uniform, national cable communications pol-
icy.8 4 Because the state ban on alcohol advertising did not extend
78 Id. at 2709. Violation of the state statute resulted in criminal prosecution. Id. at
2698.
The FCC had also set up a compulsory licensing system which permitted retransmis-
sion of distant broadcast signals without requiring the cable operator to obtain permission
from the copyright owner. Instead, the operator paid a percentage of its gross income into
a central royalty fund. The operator's inclusion in the licensing system was predicated on
the nondeletion, nonalteration of commercial advertising. By complying with the
Oklahoma statute, the operator lost the protection of the licensing system and was subject
to liability for copyright infringement. To avoid this consequence the operator had to
abandon the transmission, thus frustrating the federal objectives. Id. at 2706-07.
79 Id. at 2703.
80 The FCC had "must carry" rules requiring the transmission of broadcast signals of
local television stations within a certain area around the cable operator. Nondeletion rules
applied to the signals which the cable operators were required to carry. The FCC also
exclusively regulated the transmission of "pay cable" signals. The "must carry" and
nondeletion rules did not apply to pay cable, but the Court concluded that the Oklahoma
statute also interfered with the federal objective of diverse programming as regarded pay
cable. To delete all wine commercials from the pay cable signal would be prohibitively
burdensome, and the choice for the operator again would be to forego the programming or
face criminal prosecution for not deleting the commercials. Id. at 2703-04.
81 Id. at 2705. The Court would not disturb the FCC's judgment that this goal could
only be achieved through federal preemption of state and local regulation.
82 The Crisp Court could have used an actual conflict analysis because the state law
required the operator to delete wine commercials while the federal law forbade such dele-
tion. Therefore, an impossibility of performance situation existed.
83 The twenty-first amendment states, in part: "The transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxi-
cating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XXI, § 2.
84 104 S. Ct. at 2707.
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to print and broadcast advertisements for beer or to advertisements
for any alcohol in magazines and newspapers published outside
Oklahoma, the Court found that the state's interest was less sub-
stantial than the federal interest. According to the Court, the selec-
tivity of the ban indicated the limited nature of the state interest.
Thus, the twenty-first amendment did not save the state statute
from preemption.85
The Court engaged in this balancing test in part because
Oklahoma asserted a constitutional ground for its actions and be-
cause the regulation of the flow of alcohol into a state is a particu-
larly local concern. 86 However, when viewed as a preemption
decision with a perspective toward maintaining the balance of
power between the state and federal governments, the Court had to
find the state law preempted. The FCC had legitimately exercised
its power. The state law could not be reconciled with the objectives
of the federal regulation. The twenty-first amendment did not save
the state law from the preemptive effect of the federal regulation;
therefore the state law had to fall.8 7
Conflict preemption provides the Court with some discretion
in determining whether a state law is preempted. The strict stan-
dard for an actual conflict situation and the Burger Court's willing-
ness to dissect a state law and apply a preemption analysis to each
provision enhances the chance that at least part of the state law will
survive a preemption attack. On the other hand, the Court's will-
ingness to ignore a particularly local concern, as in de la Cuesta, de-
creases the likelihood that a state law can survive a preemption
challenge. Despite these incongruities, the Court has been consis-
tent in attempting to preserve federal power where it has been le-
gitimately exercised while simultaneously preserving the state law
when the federal law is silent on the matter.88
B. Occupation of the Field
Occupation of the field is the most comprehensive type of pre-
emption and affords state law little chance of survival. Accordingly,
the Court has been hesitant to find that the federal legislation occu-
pies the field. In fact, a majority of the Burger Court's cases involv-
ing occupation of the field preemption have upheld the state law.
85 Id. at 2709.
86 The Court noted that "[t]he States enjoy broad power under § 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor within their bor-
ders." Id. at 2707.
87 When a state's direct regulation of the sale or use of alcohol is not involved, the
Court has stated that "a conflicting exercise of federal power may prevail." Id. at 2708.
88 Although the Burger Court has found that Congress' silence may itself preclude the
operation of state law, see note 4 supra, the Court generally preserves state law in such a
situation. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, as with conflict preemption, the Court has indicated
that it will examine the subject matter of each case and will con-
sider, perhaps more carefully than in conflict cases, the state inter-
est involved.
1. The "Clear and Manifest" Intent Requirement
One of the few cases where the Burger Court has held a state
law preempted based upon an occupation of the field analysis is City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.89 City of Burbank involved a
city ordinance prohibiting jet takeoffs during the late evening and
early morning hours. 90 The Court found that the federal scheme of
regulating aircraft noise was so pervasive that it preempted the or-
dinance.9 1 According to the Court, Congress, by passing the fed-
eral regulations, intended to preclude the states from passing their
own regulations.
The Court recognized that states traditionally have had an in-
terest in noise control. Nevertheless, the Court found no room for
state regulation because of the pervasiveness of the federal
scheme 92 and the dominant federal interest in uniformity of air traf-
fic control. 93 The strong need for uniformity persuaded the Court
that Congress had intended to preempt state regulations even
though it had not specifically so stated.94
While the Court held the city ordinance preempted to maintain
a balance of federalism, 95 it has since been more hesitant to oust a
state law due to an inference of congressional intent to preempt.
For example, in Goldstein v. California,96 the Court held that neither
the copyright clause of the Constitution 97 nor the federal copyright
laws enacted thereunder 98 preempted a California statute making
89 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See generally Comment, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Termi-
nal, Inc.: Federal Preemption of Aircraft Noise Regulation and the Future of Proprietay Restrictions, 4
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 99 (1974).
90 411 U.S. at 625-26.
91 Id. at 638. The Federal Aviation Act gave the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") broad authority to regulate navigable airspace. Id. at 626-27. The Noise Control
Act of 1972, which amended the Federal Aviation Act, allowed the FAA (in conjunction
with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")) to control aircraft noise. Id. at 629.
92 Id. at 638.
93 Id. at 639.
94 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Stewart, White and Marshall, dissented. He
found no "clear and manifest" intent to preempt the city ordinance. According to Rehn-
quist, Congress could preempt the local regulations if it so chose, but until it did so, the city
ordinance should not be preempted. Id. at 653 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95 The Court would not legislate for Congress: "We are not at liberty to diffuse the
powers given by Congress to FAA and EPA by letting the States or municipalities in on the
planning. If that change is to be made, Congress alone must do it." Id. at 640.
96 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
97 See note 53 supra.
98 17 U.S.C. §§ 4, 5 (1970). The statute was amended in 1971 to allow federal copy-
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record piracy a crime.99
The Court noted that the states had not relinquished to the
federal government all power to grant copyrights. Therefore, the
states could regulate until such time as Congress decided to bring
the specific material within the statutory scheme.' 00 Congress, in
passing the copyright laws in 1909, had exhibited no intent to oc-
cupy the field of copyrighting sound recordings.1ol If Congress
passed such a law, then the state law could be preempted either
expressly or due to a conflict.
Although the area of copyright laws is one of traditional federal
concern, California had a strong economic interest in protecting
the integrity of the recording industry. The Court refused to strip
the state of its regulatory power merely on an inference of a con-
gressional intent to preempt. Rather, the Court believed that it was
for Congress to pass a law which expressly included sound record-
ings in the statutory scheme.102 The Court maintained a balance of
federalism because Congress had not yet exercised its power. The
Court also refrained from performing a legislative function.
Subsequently, in New York State Department of Social Services v.
Dublino,10 3 the Court refused to find that a provision of the Social
Security Act which established a federal work incentive program oc-
cupied the field. It upheld a New York statute requiring certain
welfare recipients to participate in a state employment program as a
condition to receiving federal aid. In reaching its decision, the
Court stressed the need for federal-state cooperation in solving the
welfare problem. 0 4 The Court found that the state had a legiti-
mate interest in encouraging its citizens to work and in dealing with
a local problem which had a great economic impact upon the
right protection of recordings but only those produced after Feb. 15, 1972. These sections
have been recodified as 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
99 412 U.S. at 571. Record piracy is "the unauthorized duplication of recordings of
performances by major musical artists." Id. at 549.
100 Id. at 558. Materials which could be included under the copyright clause could "be
of purely local importance and not worthy of national attention or protection .... Id.
101 The Court noted:
Since § 4 employs the constitutional term "writings," it may be argued that Con-
gress intended to exercise its authority over all works to which the constitutional
provision might apply. However, in the more than 60 years which have elapsed
since enactment of this provision, neither the Copyright Office, the courts, nor the
Congress has so interpreted it.
Id. at 567.
102 Id. at 559. Congress subsequently amended the copyright laws to include sound
recordings. See note 98 supra.
103 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
104 Id. at 413. The Work Incentive Program ("WIN") amended the Social Security Act
so that states were required to include WIN in their Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren programs. Under WIN, the states had to require, among other things, that employ-
able individuals register for training and employment. Id. at 410.
19851 NOTES 1249
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
state. 105 Thus, despite the pervasiveness of the federal work incen-
tive scheme, the Court refused to infer a congressional intent to
preempt absent a "clear manifestation" of that intent.10 6
The Court has also recognized the state's interest in dealing
with the problem of illegal aliens and its broad authority under the
police power to protect workers by regulating employment rela-
tionships. In DeCanas v. Bica,10 7 a California statute prohibited an
employer from knowingly employing illegal aliens if this would ad-
versely affect resident workers.' 0 8 The Court held that Congress
did not intend, by passing the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA"), to preclude all state regulation of aliens. 0 9
The comprehensiveness of the INA, which regulated the ad-
mission of aliens into the country, did not automatically include the
employment of illegal aliens. To the contrary, the Court cited evi-
dence of Congress' intent that states could regulate such employ-
ment in ways consistent with federal laws.' 10 Although it refused to
preempt under an occupation of the field analysis, the Court noted
the possibility that the state law could still pose an obstacle to the
federal law's objective.'
In Goldstein, Dublino, and DeCanas the Court emphasized the re-
quirement of a clear and manifest congressional intent to preempt
state law. This requirement allows the Court to maintain a balance
of federalism by upholding the state law until it conflicts with the
federal law or is expressly preempted by it. That the Court in both
Dublino and DeCanas reserved judgment on whether the state laws
would be preempted if they conflicted with the federal law suggests
that the Court is more concerned with federalism than with states'
105 Id. at 413.
106 Id. at 413, 415. The Court demonstrated its desire to maintain a balance between
state and federal power and also its hesitancy to preempt using an occupation of the field
analysis.
[I]f Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention clearly.
It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supercede the exer-
cise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to
do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed.
Id. at 413 (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952)). The Court declined to
rule on whether the New York statute conflicted in any way with the federal provision. Such
a decision was to be made first by the lower court. Id. at 423.
107 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976). See generally Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied
Federal Preemption Doctrine, 4 HASINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977).
108 The statute provided that "[n]o employer shall knowingly employ an alien who is not
entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an adverse
effect on lawful resident workers." 424 U.S. at 352 (quoting CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 2805
(a) (1971)).
109 424 U.S. at 359.
110 Id.at359,361.
I 11 424 U.S. at 363-64. For a conflict preemption case dealing with aliens, see Toll v.
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (preempting a state law which barred domiciled G-4 aliens from
acquiring in-state status for purposes of state university tuition).
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rights. 112
2. Occupation of the Field-The Nuclear Power Cases' l3
A relatively new area in which preemption problems have
arisen is that of nuclear power. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission," 4 the Court
upheld a California statute conditioning the construction of nuclear
power plants on a state commission finding that adequate storage
and disposal facilities were available for the nuclear waste. The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, under which the federal government
chose to exclusively regulate the nuclear and safety aspects of nu-
clear power plants, left the states free to regulate on economic
questions such as generating capacity and rates." 5
In Pacific Gas, the Court did not have to infer Congress' intent
to preempt; that intent was clear. Rather, the Court had to decide if
the state law fell within the occupied field. Under the congressio-
nally mandated system of dual regulation, the state statute need
only be preempted if it regulated the safety aspect of nuclear power
plants." 6 The Court found that the state legislation did not fall
within the occupied field because it did not regulate the safety of
the nuclear power plant. According to the Court, the statute served
economic purposes because a waste disposal problem would lead to
unpredictably high operating costs, thus making the building of the
plant economically unfeasible.' 7
By not holding the state law preempted, the Court upheld the
system of dual regulation which Congress had established-permit-
ting the states to regulate aspects which were of local concern while
not hindering the operation of a uniform system regarding the
112 One author contends that Goldstein and Dublino (as well as Kewanee Oil and Merrill
Lynch from the conflict area) demonstrate the Court's turn toward a state-directed preemp-
tion posture. See Note, supra note 16, at 652.
113 See generally, Comment, Federal Supremacy Versus Legitimate State Interests in Nuclear
Regulation: Pacific Gas and Electric and Silkwood, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 899 (1984).
114 461 U.S. 190 (1983). For a discussion of the case, see The Supreme Court, 1982 Term,
97 HARV. L. REV. 238-44 (1983).
115 461 U.S. at 205. Previously, the Court had summarily affirmed a lower court's invali-
dation of a state law which attempted to regulate radioactive releases by nuclear power
plants. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) aff'g mem., Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d
1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
116 461 U.S. at 212-13. One commentator suggests that this premise is neither reflective
of congressional intent nor consistent with the state police power to protect the public
health and safety. See Comment, supra note 113, at 931.
117 461 U.S. at 213-14. The Burger Court accepted the court of appeals' interpretation
that the purpose of the statute was economic rather than safety related, because an "inquiry
into legislative motive is often an unsatisfactory venture." Id. at 216. Such a statement is
rather anomalous because the Court itself must inquire into congressional intent in deter-
mining whether occupation of the field preemption will occur.
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safety of nuclear power plants. 18 The Court realized that by find-
ing occupation of the field preemption, it would be performing, in
effect, a legislative function, and it declined to do so. 119
Notwithstanding its decision in Pacific Gas which required the
preemption of any state law which sought to regulate the safety of
nuclear facilities, the Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 120 upheld
an award of punitive damages under a state law tort action for inju-
ries caused by nuclear radiation.' 2l The Court rejected an argu-
ment that punitive damages are imposed as a punishment and, as
such, regulate conduct related to safety, which Congress had
preempted. 122
The Court determined "[t]hat Congress assumed that persons
injured by nuclear accidents were free to utilize existing state tort
law remedies" and placed the burden on the defendant to show
that Congress intended to preclude the award of punitive dam-
ages. 123 The Court admitted that its decision created "tension be-
tween the conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern
of the federal law and the conclusion that a state may nevertheless
award damages based on its own law of liability."' 124 Nevertheless,
the Court believed it could live with this tension because it assumed
that Congress was doing the same. 125
Significantly, the Silkwood Court abandoned an occupation of
the field preemption analysis in cases of damage from radiation in-
jury.' 26 According to the Court, preemption should be based "on
118 According to one commentator, neither Pacific Gas nor Silkwood effectuates the pur-
pose of federal occupation of the nuclear safety field. See Comment, supra note 113, at 934.
119 461 U.S. at 223. The Court also refused to preempt the state law under an obstacle
conflict analysis. Although the federal law sought to encourage the development of nuclear
power, Congress had granted the states enough authority to slow the development of nu-
clear power for economic reasons. The Court left it for Congress to remedy the problem of
a state which used that authority to "undercut a federal objective." Id. at 221-23.
One author has noted that the trend in the Court's preemption decisions has been
toward "uphold[ing] state statutes whenever possible." See Note, California's Nuclear Power
Regulations: Federal Preemption?, 9 HASINGS CONST. L.Q. 623, 628 (1982).
120 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
121 Id. at 626. Karen Silkwood, an employee of Kerr-McGee, and her property were
contaminated by radiation from the defendant's nuclear facility. Silkwood died in an unre-
lated car accident, but her father, as executor of her estate, sued Kerr-McGee for damages
on common law tort principles. Kerr-McGee was subject to regulations and licensing by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act. A jury awarded
$500,000 personal injury, $5,000 property, and $10 million punitive damages. The court
of appeals reversed the award of punitive damages because of the federal statute regulating
the plant. Id. at 617-20.
122 Id. at 622.
123 Id. at 623, 625.
124 Id. at 625. One author contends that both Silkwood and Pacific Gas extend broad au-
thority to the states to regulate nuclear power, including radiation safety. See Comment,
supra note 113, at 937-38.
125 104 S. Ct. at 625.
126 Id. at 626.
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whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and
state standards or whether the imposition of a state standard in a
damages action would frustrate the objectives of the federal
law."1 27 The Court found that no such conflict existed.' 28
In general, the Burger Court has been concerned with preserv-
ing legitimately exercised federal power from encroachment by
state law. The Court's decision in Silkwood, however, protected the
states from a legitimate exercise of federal power. The federalism
which the Court preserved in Pacific Gas it abandoned in Silkwood.
The possibility that a victim may be left without a remedy influ-
enced the Court's decision to uphold the state law. Although Con-
gress meant to preempt punitive damages because they regulated
safety, Congress, for the same reason, did not intend to preempt
compensatory damages. Congress did not intend to leave a victim
without a remedy. 129 The combination of occupation of the field
preemption and a strong state interest-the protection of citizens
from injury-overrode the Court's federalism policy.
The Burger Court's general pattern in occupation of the field
cases has been to uphold the state law. While the subject matter is
important to the decision, the Court's decisions also depend on a
reluctance to preempt state law based on an inference of congres-
sional intent. If the congressional intent is clearly expressed, the
Court appears reluctant to place the state law within the occupied
field.
III. Conclusion
Although the Burger Court has applied earlier Courts' basic
preemption standards, it has adapted these standards with a view to
the subject matter of the case and the type of preemption involved.
The Court's reasoning in preemption cases focuses primarily upon
two goals: 1) not restraining the legitimate exercise of federal
power; and 2) permitting the states to regulate in areas where Con-
gress has not yet exercised its power. These factors form the foun-
dation of the Court's policy of maintaining a balance of federalism.
In determining whether state law is preempted, the Court also con-
siders the subject matter involved.
The Court's attempt to preserve a balance of federalism will
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 629. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, pointed out that the conduct which punitive
damages in effect regulated was the safety procedures of a nuclear facility licensed and
regulated by the federal government. Id. at 628. "The crucial distinction between compen-
satory and punitive damages is that the purpose of punitive damages is to regulate safety,
whereas the purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate victims." Id. at 629 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
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produce different results depending on the type of preemption.
Under a conflict preemption analysis, the Court will be more willing
to hold state laws preempted because Congress has in fact legis-
lated in the particular area. The preemption of the state law serves
as a recognition of the expanded powers of the federal government.
The Court generally will not permit state laws to stand if they con-
flict with the federal law because they inhibit the legitimate exercise
of federal power. Nevertheless, to the extent that Congress has not
legislated, the Court will not preempt a state law, especially one
involving a local interest. The Court will neither restrict Congress'
legitimate exercise of its regulatory power nor expand that power
for the Congress.
In occupation of the field preemption, the Court has observed
a presumption against the preemption of state law by requiring that
congressional intent to preempt be clear and manifest. The Court's
reluctance to preempt state law based on an inference of congres-
sional intent is consistent with the achievement of the Court's
goals. State laws generally are permitted to operate until such time
as Congress chooses to act, either expressly preempting the state
law or creating a situation where the state law conflicts with the
federal law. By requiring Congress to act first, the Court retains its
judicial role and avoids a legislative role, a significant distinction in
a government based upon the separation of powers.
Because of the fact specific nature of preemption, discerning a
"doctrine" in the Burger Court's preemption decisions may be dif-
ficult. Nevertheless, the Court does attempt to maintain a thread of
consistent reasoning in its analysis-a policy which forms a founda-
tion for its decisions. The preemption doctrine is, in the final anal-
ysis, a product of our federalist system. The Burger Court's
preemption decisions are rooted in maintaining that federalism.' 30
Elaine M. Martin
130 In a recent preemption decision, Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical
Laboratories, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2371 (1985), the Court reaffirmed its concern for maintaining
a federal-state balance. The Court held that federal regulations concerning blood plasma
collection from paid donors did not preempt local ordinances governing the plasma collec-
tion process. Id. at 2380. The federal regulations did not expressly preempt the local ordi-
nances nor did the ordinances conflict with those regulations. Id. at 2375, 2379.
With regard to occupation of the field preemption, the Court refused to infer "solely
from the comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to pre-empt in its entirety a
field related to health and safety." Id. at 2377. According to the Court, "the regulation of
health and safety matters is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern." Id. at
2378. The Court also rejected the County's argument that the dominance of the federal
interest in maintaining a national blood supply implied an intent to preempt local ordi-
nances. "Nothing in [the National Blood Policy] takes plasma regulation out of the health-
and-safety category and converts it into an area of overriding national concern." Id. The
Court thus continues to maintain a balance between federal power and states' rights.
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